^ The term “Palsgraf perspective” is drawn from Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1757, 1792 (2012) [hereinafter Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption]. Representative works include: Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 198; Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in Philosophy and the Law of Torts 214, 219 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse]; Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs 90 (2016); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 803, 808 (2001); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 160 (1995); Stephen Perry, The Role of Duty of Care in a Rights-Based Theory of Negligence Law, in The Goals of Private Law 79, 104 (Andrew Robertson & Tang Hang Wu eds., 2009); John Oberdiek, It’s Something Personal: On the Relationality of Duty and Civil Wrongs, in Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law 301, 301 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Relational Justice 3 (2024); Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights 95 (2007); Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence 297, 302 (2007); and Christopher Essert, The Value of the Neighbour Relation, in Private Law and Practical Reason 297, 301–02 (Haris Psarras & Sandy Steel eds., 2023). Accounts that can be understood as embracing some but not all aspects of the Palsgraf perspective, and that are subject to some but not all of the criticisms I press, include Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 107, 108–09 (2011); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121 Yale L.J. 142, 154 (2011); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Risk 132 (2022); Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 Am. J. Juris. 143, 196 (2002); Sandy Steel, Compensation and Continuity, 26 Legal Theory 250, 250 (2020); Steven Schaus, Wrongs to Us, 121 Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1186–88 (2023); and Stephen A. Smith, Rights, Wrongs, and Injustices 133–34 (2019).
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The lesson, I believe, is that the Palsgraf principle is unsound: One need not act wrongfully toward another — need not mistreat her, as opposed to other people — to incur a liability in morality or law to compensate her for the injuries one has inflicted on her. If that lesson is correct, however, what should we make of the black-letter proposition, which is embraced by most common law jurisdictions, that the duty of care in negligence is owed only to foreseeable victims, such that only foreseeable victims can in ordinary cases recover?144 In my view, this black-letter rule does not reflect any principled commitment to the significance of relational wrongdoing in grounding negligence liability (a commitment that would sit in stark tension with the underlying moral commitments of transferred-intent doctrine). There is, rather, a more complex moral principle operating beneath the surface of both doctrinal areas — a principle that explains why unforeseeable transferred intent victims can recover, and why unforeseeable victims of mere negligence (as in Palsgraf) typically cannot.
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